Why I am not an analytic philosopher
    David Spurrett
    School of Philosophy and Ethics University of KwaZulu-Natal Howard College Campus Durban; 4041 spurrett@ukzn.ac.za Abstract From a certain simplistic and inaccurate, although regrettably popular, perspective philosophy, at least for the past few decades, is available only in two main flavours – analytic and continental. Some self-identified members of both camps are apt to endorse uncharitable caricatures of what the others are up to. Among the many lines of criticism that can be directed against this false dichotomy, I wish to focus on discussion of a broadly naturalistic orientation that rejects many of the commitments both of paradigmatic analytic philosophy and paradigmatic continental philosophy. For the committed naturalist, the enterprise of philosophy is continuous with that of systematic empirical enquiry into the workings of the world (science). From a naturalistic perspective many of the standard moves of analytic philosophy, such as testing a proposal against ‘intuitions’, are as preposterous as the claims of ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophers sometimes appear to one another.
    
    I should begin by trying to say something about my title, and how I came to believe it acceptable to propose to talk to some sub-set of the members of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa at their annual conference about my philosophical views in a partly auto-biographical and partly polemical register, rather than to offer a more conventional presentation in which I simply show up and offer some arguments relating to some aspect of my current research. What follows is not, as it happens, free of arguments, but it is still unusually polemical in intention and unavoidably auto-biographical in genesis. For as long as I can remember, which in my case means for about 14 years, Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (hereafter PSSA) conferences, especially during the business of the AGM have seen occasional sweeping remarks about ‘analytic’ versus ‘continental’ philosophy. These remarks have usually been, at least superficially, pacific in intention – taking the forms of appeals to practitioners of the two ‘traditions’ (I’m not endorsing the view that ‘tradition’ is a useful or accurate term here) to be nice or respectful to one another, or to the editors of the South African Journal of Philosophy (hereafter SAJP) to continue to take seriously and to publish contributions coming from both ‘traditions’. Sometimes the putative fact that the PSSA includes practitioners of both ‘traditions’, or that the SAJP publishes papers written in both of them, is offered as a reason for us all to be pleased with ourselves, as though we’d collectively managed to execute some difficult trick like enjoying both baseball and cricket, or supporting Arsenal and
    
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    Manchester United at the same time.1 I’ve also myself at times been identified as an analytic philosopher, including in cases where the fact that I was apparently one bore on some important political question regarding the PSSA or SAJP.2 I’ve found these moments perplexing for a number of reasons. I don’t regard myself as an analytic philosopher, and I’ve always found the analytic/continental distinction suspect. I have, furthermore, come to find it especially unhelpful in South Africa. My main aim here isn’t to argue against the distinction, but it will be worth looking at some problems with it to pave the way to my rejection of analytic philosophy, partly in order to head of the consequence that anyone endorsing the simplistic false dichotomy would think that if I’m not analytic, I must be continental. First, it is never clear whether the classification into analytic and continental is (supposed to be) mutually exclusive, and, whether or not, why it would be. Second, it is also never clear whether the classification is supposed to be collectively exhaustive, although some sorts of remarks (for example unqualified references to ‘both traditions’3 suggest that sometimes some people think that the classification is practically exhaustive). These perplexities could perhaps be dispelled were it clearer what the positive content of the distinction was. I’ll say a little about this shortly, but for now we should at least note that there are some quite serious problems with affirmative answers to the questions just raised. If the distinction is mutually exclusive, then it must be impossible in some sense to be an analytic Heideggerean, or Derridean. (So that the main thesis of the book Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy (Wheeler 2000) is false by definition). And commentators who have discerned continuity of concerns between, say, Derrida and Davidson (including Wheeler 2000, 2005), or Heidegger and Quine (e.g. Matthews 2003) just have to be mistaken. The same goes for the considerable fertility of arguments and ideas to nominally ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy from various thinkers during the acknowledged existence of analytic philosophy, notably including Wittgenstein (e.g. Lyotard and Thébaud 1985, Austin 1962), and the common importance of leading historical figures such as Descartes, Aristotle, and Kant. These last consequences are intolerable enough, it seems to me, to count as a reductio ad absurdum of the mutual exclusivity claim. It is possible, sometimes, that people who think that the analytic/continental distinction is deeply significant might intend, or be inclined to defend, some kind of incommensurability thesis about the relationship between the two, to the effect that there was an unbridgeable and interpretation-defeating, comparison thwarting gulf between the two of them. Although once popular in the philosophy of science, such theses in their strong forms have fallen on hard times even in cases where they once looked strongest. So it seems prima facie unlikely that there could be a compelling general argument for a mutual exclusivity thesis here.
    1 2 3 In his opening remarks at the 2008 conference of the PSSA at which this paper was delivered PSSA President Pieter Duvenage referred to the two traditions as being “two fundamentally different styles of thinking”. I have in mind here especially the difficult debate that took place at the 2007 AGM of the PSSA, where specific allegations of bias against ‘continental’ and in favour of ‘analytic’ philosophy were made against the then editors of the South African Journal of Philosophy. A comment including unqualified reference to ‘both traditions’ (where context made clear that the two were ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’) was made by the President of the PSSA, Pieter Duvenage, at the 2007 AGM of the PSSA in Stellenbosch, and again in opening the 2008 conference in Pretoria.
    
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    It is even more easy to see that the distinction can’t be exhaustive. For a start, most of the recorded history of philosophy (around 95% if you just count the centuries) predates it. It’s nonsensical to ask whether Kant, or Descartes, or Aristotle were analytic or continental philosophers. There are also, and this is a really uncontroversial point, many active kinds of philosophy right now. Current professional academic practice in philosophy correspondingly embraces a large variety of specialisations. There are many kinds of applied philosophical practice, especially in ethics, and only a small fraction of the work in this collection of areas is straightforwardly analytic or continental in orientation. There are also many examples of cross-over work, such as where analytic methods and approaches are brought to bear on problems not initially conceived of in those terms. Examples of this include analytical Marxism (e.g. Cohen 1978) and analytic existentialism (the subject of a 2001 conference held in Cape Town). Much philosophy of religion is neither analytic nor continental, often drawing as it does on philosophy (Thomism, phenomenology) from prior to the setting up of that distinction. It is surely especially worth noting in here and now that most African Philosophy, along with all world philosophy not fitting into a specific and rather short historical period in Western Europe and North America (plus Australia) resists classification into being either analytic or continental, and hence that blithe assertions that there are two kinds of philosophy, analytic and continental, are especially exclusionary if made in Africa, or elsewhere outside the developed world mainstream. (That is, unless they are breathtakingly condescending, assuming that African philosophy is part of continental philosophy. The various rich connections, for example between some existentialism, psychoanalysis and phenomenology and some African and post-colonial philosophy (e.g. Fanon 1967), surely don’t warrant the colonialism of an assimilation thesis.) Some schools of thought, such as pragmatism, interestingly straddle the purported analytic-continental distinction. So Rorty, a lively opponent of most analytic philosophy champions pragmatism as an alternative, but in doing so explicitly draws inspiration from figures like Quine and Davidson (e.g. in his 1979), both often taken to be paradigmatic late analytic philosophers. More importantly still, a growing naturalist tendency in philosophy sees philosophical practice as in important respects continuous with empirical science, and rejects in various ways paradigmatic features of analytic philosophy, such as appeals to intuitions. I’ll return to this shortly. Rorty (2003) suggests that the distinctions between different kinds of philosophy are largely institutional, maintained by the needs of graduate students to prepare for employment in the competitive first world market, and he is surely partly correct in this. In the highly professionalised and competitive universities of the developed world, for better or worse, job advertisments are typically highly specific (‘philosopher of biology’ rather than ‘philosopher of science’), especially at leading universities with large departments. Graduate students tailor their profiles to the market, and the specific niches they aspire to occupy. It doesn’t dilute the effect that only a tiny minority make it into the best departments – all kinds of places end up hiring people whose CVs are tailored for the elite departments. Institutional distinctions can survive independently of settling, and alongside active ambiguity about, fine questions of content such as those regarding whether the analytic/continental distinction (or what counts as a historian of philosophy, or a specialist in ancient philosophy, etc.) is exclusive or exhaustive. They identify in groups and out-groups, like the old distinction between ‘hips’ and ‘squares’ and can (and do) rely
    
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    heavily on proxies like where a person did her PhD, or who was her supervisor. Such proxies need not, and do not, track fine details such as exactly what was in someone’s thesis (did her work on Quine include a Chapter on Derrida) or what everyone in a department, or a thesis supervisor, works on, who visits, etc. Despite the difficulties canvassed above, and allowing that for many purposes the distinction is more usefully regarded as institutional than philosophical, I’ll need to make a more precise target of analytic philosophy in order to make an argument against it. This won’t be easy. A list of the philosophers likely to be counted as analytic, such as Moore, Russell, Kripke, Kaplan, Chisholm, Davidson, Brandom, Carnap, Lewis, Armstrong, Austin, Hempel, and Wittgenstein, makes clear almost immediately that no list of necessary and sufficient conditions is going to pick out these philosophers and fail to include doubtful and incorrect cases. It is also necessary to note that the history of philosophy includes various discussions of analysis, and the relation between analysis and philosophy, or the ways in which analysis variously conceived relates to the proper method of philosophy, independently of the specific movement initially called ‘analytic philosophy’ and its descendents and elaborations. Among the models of analysis taken seriously as a resource in philosophy is ancient geometry. The ‘Socratic method’ is sometimes regarded as a form of analysis, and the Meno is usefully seen as Plato’s discussion of the paradox of analysis (a discussion that itself draws on geometric arguments and procedures). Aristotle explicitly compares philosophical argument to geometrical procedures as well, for example saying in the Nicomachean Ethics (1908) that “the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation- for instance mathematical investigations- but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming” (Book III, section 3). There are subtle and detailed discussions of analysis in medieval philosophy, including in Aquinas (see, e.g., Sweeney 1994) and Buridan (2001). Rediscovery and retranslation of various Greek texts inspired further debate over analysis in the Renaissance. A vital figure in the modern story is Descartes, who himself made major contributions to what is now known as analytic geometry, and insisted on the importance of analysis in philosophy. (See especially the Rules for the Direction of the Mind in Descartes 1985, Volume 1). In reply to a query from Mersenne Descartes wrote that “it is analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this method alone which I employed in my Meditations” (Descartes 1985, Volume 2: p110-11.) Leading early modern Western philosophers whether empiricist or rationalist shared some ideas about analysis. Thus Locke, in a sentence that might well, but for the style, be found in Descartes or Hume, wrote that “all our complex Ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple Ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex Ideas” (Locke 1975, Book II, xxii, 9). Allowing, then, that ‘analysis’ is by no means philosophically univocal, and that millennia of philosophical discussion of it predates analytic philosophy, what can we say about the movement called analytic philosophy? The first six decades or so of branded ‘analytic philosophy’ can usefully be seen as proceeding through about four relatively clear stages, after which the proliferation of
    
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    separate developments and sub-traditions makes it much less clear that there is such a thing as analytic philosophy to be found. In the first stage Moore (e.g. 1903) and Russell rejected Kantian and Hegelian idealism in favour of a quasi-Platonist realism4 about ‘propositions’ with considerable emphasis on ‘meanings’. Their work also involved a turn away from the habit of offering very broad philosophical theories in favour of focussed treatments of specific issues (see Russell’s account in his 1959). In the second stage Russell abandoned propositional realism in favour of logical atomism (e.g. Russell 1918), in this to some extent inspired by the work of the early Wittgenstein (1922). This is also when Russell developed the theory of descriptions, as a response to problems with the Meinongian object theory of meaning. Moore, for his part, turned towards common sense realism, for example in his (1925). Logical positivism is a third stage. In it some of the general philosophical commitments of the analytic movement, including logical atomism (Wittgenstein’s 1922 Tractatus was a major source for logical positivists as well as for earlier logical atomists), are combined with the positivism as found in such thinkers as Mach. Unlike either of the first two stages, logical positivists tend to maintain that the only knowledge is scientific or empirical knowledge, and dismiss non-tautological claims that cannot be empirically verified as being meaningless. A key text here is Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936). The fourth relatively clear stage is provided by ‘ordinary language’ philosophy, or ordinary language analysis. Key figures here include the later Wittgenstein (1953) and some who associated with him at Cambridge, but also a number of Oxford philosophers including Gilbert Ryle (e.g. 1959) and Paul Grice (e.g. 1989) and J. L. Austin (e.g. 1962). The ways in which this programme was a reaction against the ideal language philosophy of the second stage is clearly seen in Wittgenstein – whereas before Wittgenstein had held that philosophical problems were to be resolved by translating claims into symbolic form, now he maintained they could be dispelled by diligent investigation of how language was actually used. Malcolm credits Moore with a key insight here: Moore’s great historical role consists in the fact that he has been perhaps the first philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement that violates ordinary language is false, and consistently to defend ordinary language against its philosophical violators (Malcolm 1942: p368). Beyond the heyday of the ordinary language movement the picture is considerably more complicated. Important criticisms of the analytic project, such as those of Quine (1951) against logical positivism and other attacks on ordinary language philosophy (including Gellner 1959) partly explain this. An additional reason for fragmentation is provided by innovations such as those of Kripke (1972) and other theories of reference, and the a revival of overtly speculative metaphysics, partly through Lewis’s (1973) elaboration of Davidson’s attempt to develop a formal theory of meaning based on Tarski’s semantics (e.g. Davidson 1967) into possible world semantics. The robost hostility of various parts of analytic philosphy (including both stages of Wittgenstein and logical positivism) to history has given way to far greater interest in the history of
    4 This is not specifically analytic, indeed Moore’s views had features in common with Bolzano and others, including Husserl. Bell (1999) argues that Moore may have got to these views partly by reading within this Austro-German tradition (See Bell 1999).
    
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    philosophy, and many notable contemporary analytic philosophers (Peter Hacker (e.g. 1996) is one example) are also serious scholars of the history of philosophy. Given this variety, it’s difficult to say that analytic philosophy presents a single target. Dummett himself notes that what he calls the ‘fundamental axiom’ of analytic philosophy, the thesis analysis of language is prior to the analysis of thought (Dummett 1993: p128) excludes canonical works such as Evans (1982). When Dummett goes on to say that Evans remains inside the fold, despite not endorsing the supposedly ‘fundamental axiom’ (itself apt to give false positives) because Evans adopts “a certain philosophical style” and appeals “to certain writers rather than others” (Dummett 1993, 5) it seems to me that he concedes Rorty’s point about noted above to the effect that the distinction is more institutional than philosophical. Another popular suggestion to the effect that analytic philosophy is distinguished by preference for rigorous treatments of relatively specific problems gives false negatives, because some clearly works are broad in scope, and false negatives, because of paradigmatic ‘continental’ discussions of highly specific questions, such as Derrida’s ‘Signature, Event, Context’ (in his 1985). I’m not going to try to extract a determinate target that is analytic philosophy – it’s no part of my brief here to defend the view that there is a “fundamental style of thinking” that is analytic philosophy. Rather I want to sketch some of the reasons for taking seriously a substantially separate (even if sometimes overlapping with putatively analytic and continental philosophy) approach, and one that is harmfully ignored by anyone endorsing the view that the simplistic analytic/continental dichotomy exhausts contemporary philosophy. This approach is naturalism. In keeping with some streams of logical positivism, naturalist philosophy admires science, but views philosophy as continuous with science rather than performing logical housekeeping for it. Quine’s famous attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction (an old distinction, but it’s Carnap’s version Quine was stalking) was a crucial contribution to the most recent version of the tendency to view philosophy as continuous with the empirical science, and the rejection of the view that conceptual analysis was an epistemically defensible enterprise.5 One cautionary note is called for. There are various ways of being epistemically impressed by science, partly because of the variety of philosophies of science. When just any positive attitude to science is lumped together, one ends up with unhelpful caricatures, leading to positions like Adorno’s classification of Popper as a ‘positivist’ (Adorno et al, 1976), or Allen’s attempt to distinguish analytic from continental philosophy (in Prado 2003).6 Although beyond the scope of the present paper, a forceful statement of the main outlines of the naturalism I endorse can be found in Ross et al (2007). I organise the present sketch of reasons for naturalism under two main headings, with some overlap between them – scepticism about folk theories in various domains and complementary claims made by the recent experimental philosophy movement, the growing importance of cognitive prostheses in gaining knowledge. To begin with, a body of work in various fields has shown or argued that folk theories in many areas, including psychology (e.g. Churchland & Churchland 1998), phys5 6 One recent defence of conceptual analysis, with a qualified rejection of Quine’s critique of analyticity, has been offered by Frank Jackson in his book, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998). Lumping analytic philosophy and naturalism is especially awkward given the brisk rejection of the relevance of science to philosophy in influential figures like Wittgenstein.
    
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    ics (e.g. Hayes 1979, 1985a, b) and biology (Medin & Atran 1999). This is relevant to philosophy insofar as much analytic metaphysics is at least implicitly inimical to science, in the ways it prioritises armchair intuitions about the nature of the universe over scientific discoveries. This is anti-naturalist twice over.7 First, appeal to intuitions here pretends that science, especially physics, has not shown us that the actual universe is deeply alien to our default conception of the world. Second, and the two are connected, privileging intuitions ignores key findings the cognitive and behavioural sciences (including evolutionary theory), concerning the nature of our minds, which partly explain why our default conception is tailored to a different task than fundamental knowledge of reality. What people find intuitive is neither highly determinate nor stable. For people in general, what counts as intuitive depends partly on our evolved cognitive makeup and partly on culturally specific learning and training. Intuitions are the basis for, and are reinforced and modified by, everyday practical heuristics for getting around in the world under various constraints, and coping with the social world; they are not designed to produce reliable guidance in philosophy, mathematics or the scientific study of the world. In light of the dependence of intuitions on species, cultural, and individual learning histories, we should expect variation in what is taken to be intuitive, and this is just what we find. In the case of judgements about causes, for example, Morris and colleagues (1995) report that Chinese and American subjects differ with respect to how they spontaneously allocated causal responsibility to agents and environmental factors. Even if there was some determinate and universal fact about what was intuitive to humans, we’d need an argument for making the intuitions in question part of the explanandum for metaphysics, or for allowing them to exercise any argumentative influence at all. (Descartes, for example, claimed to have reason for thinking that his mind was, if used correctly, a perfect truth detector.) Any such argument will have to confront the fact that data that might plausibly be taken to indicate what our intuitions are sometimes shows that they are systematically misleading by the lights of our scientific and mathematical theories of the relevant domains. There are interpretive controversies about some of these data, but it seems clear that people are spontaneously unreliable at judgements in various domains including conditional dependence, as measured in the Wason selection task (see Cosmides 1989); probability, where many people will, for example, assert that the conjunction of two possibilities is more likely than one of the conjuncts alone (Tversky and Kahneman 1983); strategic anticipation, where they don’t look forward to others’ goals and then reason back over their probable means (Camerer 2003); and in other areas. Commentators on science have pointed out in various ways how science is at odds with common sense or the intuitive. Thus Wolpert says that “both the ideas that science generates and the way in which science is carried out are entirely counter-intuitive and against common sense – by which I mean that scientific ideas cannot be acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and that they are very often outside everyday experience” (Wolpert 1992: p1). He later makes a stronger claim: “I would almost contend that if something fits with common sense it almost certainly isn’t science” (1992:p 11). More recently rather than inferring from experimental psychology to scepticism about the methods of analytic philosophy, members of the experimental philosophy movement have directly conducted experiments concerned with intuitions and folk
    7 This paragraph and the next two retrace steps occurring in Ross, Ladyman & Spurrett (2007).
    
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    opinions in a range of areas. Weinberg et al (2001) argue that intuitions are not human universals, but vary with factors including cultural and educational background. Swain et al (in press) argue that the specific pattern of cases recently considered by a subject makes a difference to their judgements in cases where it was previously supposed that intuitions were uniform and stable. Weinberg et al call the philosophical tradition that takes intuitions as data ‘Epistemic Romanticism’ and call it ‘a very bad idea’ (2001: 434). Alexander and Weinberg elsewhere argue that the world of experimental philosophers ‘challenges the suitability of intuitions to function in any evidentiary role’ (2007: 63). In another bracing statement Bishop and Trout argue that the methods of ‘Standard Analytic Epistemology ...are suited to the task of providing an account of the considered epistemic judgments of (mostly) well-off Westerners with Ph.D.’s in Philosophy’ (2005: 107). These claims are of course controversial. For defence of aspects of analytic philosophy, and arguments against some of the specific claims of experimental philosophers, see, among others, Sosa (2006, in press) who suggests that an error theory may be able to explain the observed disagreements, and that verbal disagreement doesn’t entail conceptual disagreement, and Kauppinen (in press), who argues that the claim of analytic philosophy applies to what the folk would say only under specific and demanding conditions, conditions more demanding than typical experimental philosophy conditions. Further defence of intuitions can be found in Liao (in press). An additional set of reasons for thinking that the solitary intellect of any human, whether trained philosopher or not, come from work on the ways in which applied epistemology, in the work of science, increasingly depends on cognitive augmentations of various kinds. Paul Humphreys (e.g. 2004) has argued that empirical discovery in various domains is increasingly dependent on the use of tools, especially including computer models, that are what he calls ‘epistemically opaque’, that is not amenable in principle to having their detailed operation verified by human processes, but which can be taken to work on the basis of a set of indirect inferences about aspects of their performance. Recent cognitive science, including Hutchins (1995) and Clark (1997), among others, have also made a great deal of the social and material distribution of cognition, even though neither has drawn conclusions relevant to general epistemic practice in philosophy. The philosophy suggested by these brief reflections is broadly empiricist – suspicious at best of claims to a priori knowledge, concerned that claims have empirical content, and that attention be paid to the evidence bearing on them. It’s broadly naturalist in a roughly Quinean sense – philosophy and science are distinguished to the extent that they are, again roughly, by the degree of generality of the conclusions they aspire to consider and defend, and not because philosophy can claim any legitimate methodological or other autonomy. Contemporary naturalism also tends to be less anthropocentric. Also, clearly, it isn’t analytic philosophy. References Adorno, T. W., Albert, H. , Dahrendorf, R., Habermas, J., Pilot, H. & Popper, K. R. (Eds.) (1976) The positivist dispute in German sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby. London: Heinemann.
    
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